












Annemarie S. Walter and Hugo Drochon 
School of Politics and International Relations  





What explains conspiracy thinking in Europe and America? This is the first and largest comparative 
study of conspiracy thinking to date, presenting findings using a representative sample of 11,523 
respondents in 9 countries. First, it shows that the overall level of conspiracy thinking in Europe is 
equal to or slightly lower than the US, contradicting the notion that conspiracy theories is an 
especially American phenomenon. Second, people more inclined to conspiracy thinking position 
themselves towards the right of the political spectrum, engage in magical thinking, feel distrust 
towards public officials and reject the political system. Finally, we find that – surprisingly – the 
country context in which respondents reside has hardly any effect as predictor of levels of 
conspiracy thinking or as a moderator of individual-level determinants. Heterogeneity in 
conspiratorial thinking seems to be largely a function of individual traits. 
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From JFK to the X-Files to 9/11, and now with a president who famously launched his political career 
with the ‘birther’ movement (Drochon, 2018), conspiracy theories are often perceived to be an 
especially American affliction, and this alleged exceptionalism has been reinforced by the field of 
cultural and American studies (Knight 2001, 2002; Melley 2000; Fenster 2008). But Europeans, at 
least going back to the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, have their own tradition. So, who is more 
likely to believe in conspiracy theories?  
 With the current rise of fake news and misinformation, the study of conspiracy theories is 
gaining increased attention. And far from being an amusing peccadillo, belief in conspiracy theories 
is linked to health risks, negative attitudes and prejudices towards groups in society, political 
radicalization, political violence, political disengagement and diminishing support for public policies, 
such as measures against climate change and vaccination (Douglas et al., 2019; van Prooijen and 
Douglas, 2018). Following Smallpage et al. (2020), we define a Conspiracy Theory as ‘a proposed 
explanation of events or circumstances (past, present or future) which cites as the primary cause a 
conspiracy. Conspiracy theories could be either true or false, and, in most circumstances, contradict 
the proclamations of epistemological authorities’. Conspiracy Beliefs, therefore, are those specific 
conspiracy theories that individuals will say are true. Finally, Conspiracy Thinking, what is sometimes 
also referred to as ‘conspiracy ideation’ or ‘conspiracy mentality’, is a stable predisposition that 
drives individuals to see events as the product of a conspiracy.  
 People are not equally prone to conspiracy thinking, so what explains people’s propensity to 
conspiracy thinking? Most work on conspiracy beliefs examines a single context, primarily the United 
States (Enders and Smallpage, 2018, for non-US single country studies see e.g. Mancosu et al., 2017; 
Jasinskaja-Lahti and Jetten, 2019; Krouwel et al., 2017; Sidiqui, 2018; Swami, 2012; and Hogg et al., 
2017). However, even when studies are conducted in different contexts, many are based on 
different concepts, operationalizations and analytical approaches, thereby making systematic 
comparison problematic (Nyhan and Zeithoff, 2018 are the exception). The lack of comparative work 
raises important questions: to what extent are findings context-specific, and how does context affect 
people’s belief in conspiracy theories? To develop a general theory of conspiracy thinking, we need 
work examining conspiracy belief in different contexts, not only to verify the general applicability of 
findings but also to formulate and test theories on how context characteristics interact with 
individuals’ characteristics affecting their conspiracy thinking (Douglas et al., 2019; van Prooijen and 
Douglas, 2018). 
 In this paper we present the first cross-national representative sample survey of conspiracy 
beliefs across 8 European countries (Sweden, France, Germany, United Kingdom, Portugal, Italy, 
Poland, Hungary) and the United States, analyzing data of 11,523 respondents collected by YouGov 
in August 2018. This study contributes to the field in various ways. To begin, it is the first and largest 
integrated comparative study of conspiracy beliefs in the US and Europe to date. Second, it assesses 
the ways in which these beliefs are interconnected and consequently the structure of conspiracy 
belief systems. Third, it tests for the first time the universality of individual-level predictors 
explaining conspiracy thinking, thereby testing the external validity of findings of previous single 
country studies. Finally, it offers the first exploration of the importance of country-level and cross-
level predictors for explaining conspiracy thinking. Taken together, these contributions are a 
fundamental step towards developing a broader theory of conspiracy thinking. 
 We find that to explain people’s propensity to conspiracy thinking, we first have to look at 
individual-level predictors as the effects of country-level and cross-level predictors are surprisingly 
limited. As such: the propensity to conspiracy thinking almost appears like an anthropological 
constant. This appears to replicate psychological work that takes this view as its premise, but 
contradicts a basic ontological assumption of the social sciences that people’s attitudes and 
behaviour are affected by the context that they live in.  We demonstrate people’s proneness to 
conspiracy thinking to be particularly conditional on ideological position, magical thinking, trust in 
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public figures and attitude towards the political system.  Moreover, contrary to both the popular 
view and the one professed by American and cultural studies, we find that these 8 European 
countries have similar or slightly lower overall levels of conspiracy thinking compared to the United 
States: Europeans and Americans are as likely to believe in conspiracy theories as each other. 
 First, we discuss the literature on conspiracy thinking and individual-level, country-level and 
cross-level predictors, which leads to our hypotheses. Second, we present our data, analytical design 
and operationalization of our variables. We then present and discuss the results, and end by drawing 
conclusions and implications for further study of conspiracy thinking. 
 
 
Who believes in conspiracy theories? 
What explains people’s tendency towards conspiracy thinking in Europe and America? Conspiracy 
thinking is a property that varies from individual to individual. The notion of conspiracy thinking is 
based on the finding that people who already believe in a particular conspiracy theory are more 
likely to believe in others that are not necessarily related or may even be contradictory (Douglas et 
al. ,2019; Swami et al., 2011; Swami and Furnham, 2012; Wood et al., 2012).  
 Numerous studies have been conducted identifying characteristics and attitudes that explain 
belief in specific conspiracy theories and/or a general tendency towards conspiracy thinking 
(Douglas et al. 2019). These studies have looked at personality traits (e.g. Swami et al., 2011; Darwin 
et al., 2011), sociodemographic factors (e.g. Freeman and Bentall, 2017; Stempel, et al., 2007; Hogg 
et al., 2017), political ideology (e.g. Uscinski and Parent, 2014; van Prooijen et al., 2015; Krouwel et 
al., 2017; Galliford and Furnham, 2017), religious and supernatural beliefs (e.g. Oliver and Wood, 
2014; Galliford and Furnham, 2017; Jasinskaja‐Lahti and Jetten, 2019), media exposure (e.g. Mulligan 
and Habel, 2012; Einstein and Glick, 2015; Warner and Neville-Shepard, 2014) and politico-economic 
exclusion (e.g. Hofstadter, 1996; Uscinski and Parent, 2014; Drochon, 2018). We will test various 
forms of these theories in a comparative perspective.  
First of all, we look at the role of sociodemographic variables. Some studies find that 
conspiracy believers are more likely to be male (Freeman and Bentall, 2017; Hogg et al., 2017; 
Galliford and Furnham, 2017), other studies claim that conspiracy believers are more likely to be 
female (Mancuso et al., 2017; Stempel et al, 2007), and still others find that gender does not matter 
at all (Uscinski and Parent, 2014; Enders and Smallpage, 2019). Research suggests that those who 
are unmarried (Freeman and Bentall, 2017), unemployed (Freeman and Bentall, 2017; Hogg et al., 
2017), younger (Goertzel, 1994; Stempel et al., 2007; Galliford and Furnham, 2017) and/or poorly 
educated are more likely to engage in conspiracy thinking (Mancosu et al., 2017; Uscinski and 
Parent, 2014; Freeman and Bentall, 2017; Bogart and Bird, 2003; Oliver and Wood, 2014; van 
Prooijen, 2017; Douglas et al., 2016; Galliford and Furnham, 2017; Hollanders, 2018), although again 
not all studies find a link between education and conspiracy thinking (Goertzel, 1994; Galliford and 
Furnham, 2017; Enders and Smallpage, 2019). 
How gender, employment, marital status and age are linked to conspiracy thinking is 
somewhat undertheorized. Substantially more theory can be found on how education is linked to 
conspiracy thinking. First of all, people with low levels of education might have lower analytical skills 
(van Prooijen, 2017). Analytical thinking is negatively related to belief in conspiracy theories, as 
analytical skills enable people to evaluate conspiracy theories more critically, in particular conspiracy 
theories that defy logic and are not supported by evidence (Swami et al., 2014). An alternative 
explanation is that those with lower educational qualifications would be more inclined to attribute 
agency and intentionality in circumstances when it does not exist and thus have a stronger tendency 
to conspiracy thinking (Douglas et al., 2016). Finally, highly educated people feel more in control of 
their environment and are therefore less likely to engage in conspiracy thinking (van Prooijen, 2017). 




Education Hypothesis (H1): we expect conspiracy thinking to be dependent on citizens’ level of 
education, whereby the higher the education level, the lower people’s propensity to conspiracy 
thinking.   
 
After examining the link between conspiracy thinking and various sociodemographic 
variables, we look at how people’s attitudes matter for conspiracy thinking. Conspiracy thinking is 
often thought to be connected to people’s ideology, although not all studies find that link (Dieguez 
et al., 2015).  Several studies have found conspiracy thinking to be stronger at the political extremes 
(van Prooijen et al., 2015; Krouwel et al., 2017). Although all kinds of people engage in conspiracy 
thinking, conspiracy thinking is according to some stronger on the far right than the far left (van 
Prooijen et al., 2015; Krouwel et al., 2017; Galliford and Furnham, 2017; Linden et al. 2020). The 
reason for this might be that people on the right are more likely to have personality predispositions 
that stimulate conspiracy thinking, such as low tolerance for uncertainty and a desire for simple 
solutions and order (Jost et al., 2003, van Prooijen et al., 2015). The link between ideological 
extremity and conspiracy thinking is contested by some US studies that argue that conspiracy 
thinking is stronger among individuals who consider themselves independents or associate with 
third parties (non-Democrats and Republicans) (Uscinski and Parent, 2014; Uscinski et al., 2016). 
Subsequently, we formulate the following hypotheses: 
 
Rightwing Hypothesis (H2): we expect people’s propensity to conspiracy thinking to be conditional 
on their ideological position, whereby the more people perceive themselves as positioned towards 
the right of the political spectrum, the higher their propensity to conspiracy thinking.  
Ideological Extremity Hypothesis (H3): we expect people’s propensity to conspiracy thinking to be 
conditional on the extremity of their ideological position, whereby people who perceive themselves 
as positioned on the ideological extremes of the political spectrum have a higher propensity to 
conspiracy thinking than respondents who perceive themselves in the centre of the political 
spectrum.  
 
Conspiracy thinking has been found to be associated with supernatural beliefs such as 
religious beliefs (e.g., Oliver and Wood, 2014; Mancuso et al., 2017; Galliford and Furnham, 2017; 
Jasinskaja‐Lahti and Jetten, 2019) and belief in the paranormal (e.g., Swami and Furnham, 2012; 
Swami et al., 2011), but there are exceptions (Freeman and Bentall, 2017). People who hold 
supernatural beliefs tend to be more superstitious and conspiracy thinking shows similarities with 
belief in an entity that is all-powerful (Jasinskaja‐Lahti and Jetten, 2019). Conspiracy thinking is 
therefore associated with so-called magical thinking, which is the willingness to believe in 'unseen, 
intentional and malevolent forces to explain an event, instead of directly seen or observable ones’ 
(Oliver and Wood, 2014: 953). Consequently, we formulate the following hypothesis:  
 
Magical Thinking Hypothesis (H4): we expect people’s propensity to conspiracy thinking to be 
conditional on their degree of magical thinking, whereby people who have a high level of magical 
thinking have a greater tendency to conspiracy thinking. 
 
 It is also argued that conspiracy thinking is associated with people who feel powerless and 
excluded (Hofstadter, 1996; Uscinski and Parent, 2014; Drochon, 2018), however others dispute this 
view and argue that any ordinary citizen can become a conspiracy theorist (e.g. Radnitz and 
Underwood, 2017). Uscinski and Parent (2014) argue that in particular people who do not feel that 
their interests are represented within the political system are likely to believe in conspiracy theories. 
Consequently, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
Representation Within the Political System Hypothesis: we expect people’s tendency to conspiracy 
thinking to be dependent on the extent that they feel represented within the political system, 
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whereby people who do not feel represented within the political system are more inclined to 
conspiracy thinking than people who do feel represented within the political system. 
 
Another indicator of political exclusion than not feeling represented within the political 
system is overall distrust in political institutions and their representatives. Various studies have 
found political distrust to be associated with a stronger propensity to conspiracy thinking (Imhoff 
and Bruder, 2014) - conspiracy theorists tend to reject the ‘official line’ (Wood et al., 2012) - and 
political trust with a lower propensity to conspiracy thinking (Jasinskaja‐Lahti and Jetten, 2019; 
Einstein and Glick, 2015; Swami et al., 2010, 2011), although not all studies agree (Mancuso et al., 
2017). We formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
Institutional Trust Hypothesis: we expect people’s tendency to conspiracy thinking to be dependent 
on their level of institutional trust, whereby people who have low levels of institutional trust are 
more inclined to conspiracy thinking than people who have high levels of institutional trust.i 
 
Drochon (2018) argues that it is not about representation within the political system itself, 
but that conspiracy theorists reject the political system as a whole. We formulate the following 
hypothesis:  
 
Political System Rejection Hypothesis: we expect people’s tendency to conspiracy thinking to be 
dependent on their attitudes towards the political system, whereby people who reject the political 
system as a whole are more inclined to conspiracy thinking than those who do not reject the political 
system.ii 
 
Drochon (2018) also argues that we should not solely look at political exclusion, but also 
economic exclusion. There is work linking economic insecurity to belief in conspiracy theories 
(Goertzel, 1994), but findings are inconclusive (Hollanders, 2018). We formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Economic Insecurity Hypothesis: we expect people’s tendency to conspiracy thinking to be affected 
by their economic security, whereby people who feel insecure about their economic situation have a 
higher propensity to conspiracy thinking.  
 
 Various studies find that the media also play an important role in conspiracy thinking, as 
exposure to media messages propagating conspiracy theories leads to greater belief in conspiracy 
theories not only in the short term (Mulligan and Habel, 2012; Einstein and Glick, 2015; Warner and 
Neville-Shepard, 2014), but in the long term too (Kim and Cho, 2016). Hollanders (2018) did not find 
an effect of news exposure but did find that exposure to Fox News is positively related to belief in 
conspiracy theories, he therefore argues against the use of generic media measures in studies. In 
particular, studies find that exposure to nonmainstream media that are more likely to contain 
misinformation, such as blogs, tabloids and YouTube news channels, stimulates conspiracy thinking 
(Stempel et al., 2017).  
 
Nonmainstream News Hypothesis: we expect people’s media use to affect their tendency to 
conspiracy thinking, the more people expose themselves to nonmainstream media news the more 
prone they are to conspiracy thinking.  
 
We know that people respond differently to similar phenomena in different contexts and 
thus this raises the question whether people’s proneness to conspiracy thinking is context 
dependent. We do not assume that people across countries are intrinsically different, but that the 
way in which their orientations and motivations can manifest themselves differ. For social scientists 
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including political scientists, context is an important explanatory factor for studying political 
attitudes and behaviour across countries and regions. For instance, people’s level of political 
knowledge is not just a reflection of individual characteristics, such as their level of education and 
political interest, but also their context, as people’s access to high quality information about political 
processes is dependent on the their media environment (Granberg and Holmberg, 1988). Another 
example is that a voter’s propensity to vote cannot just be explained with individual characteristics 
such as sense of civic duty or political interest, but it is also important to take context characteristics 
into account, such as the electoral system and the presence of compulsory voting rules (Stockemer, 
2017; Singh, 2011).  
 Due to the focus on single country studies, research on how context affects people’s 
conspiracy thinking has been limited and consequently the theory is somewhat underdeveloped. In 
the literature we find suggestions that context is important for conspiracy thinking  (Uscinski and 
Parent, 2014) and that conspiracy thinking may be affected by the level of democratization or quality 
of democracy (Smallpage, 2018; Drochon, 2018), the electoral system (Uscinski and Parent, 2014), or 
the country’s economic wealth and economic inequality (Drochon, 2018). However, these authors 
are not clear on whether these effects are main effects,iii moderation effectsiv or composition 
effects.v Without formulating explicit hypotheses the question of how context matters remains 
open. We therefore take the freedom to interpret these relationships as both main and moderation 
effects and explore whether they matter for conspiracy thinking. In addition, we will control in our 




The data used in this article was collected as part of the Conspiracy and Democracy project at 
CRASSH, the University of Cambridge. It was collected online by YouGov using representative 
samples of the population between 14th August and 31st August 2018. The total number of 
observations in the dataset is 11,523. The respondents reside in France (N=1019), Sweden (N=1009), 
Germany (N=2065), Great Britain (N=2171), Italy (N=1012), Portugal (N=1003), Poland (N=1016), 
Hungary (N=1005) and the United States (N=1223). The European countries were selected from all 
European countries to maximize variation in terms of ‘deemed relevant’ independent factors, such 
as democratic quality, economic inequality and electoral system. This is a variant of the well-known 
‘most different cases design’ that can be used in the absence of definitive information about their 
values on outcome variables (Przeworski and Teune, 1970). The US was selected as a baseline 
category.  
 To measure conspiracy thinking we offered respondents a number of conspiracy theory 
statements they could agree or disagree with. The question asked was: ‘Which, if any, of the 
following statements would you say are true? (Please select all that apply)’, and respondents could 
choose the answer options ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. See Table 1 for the surveyed conspiracy theory items, see 
Table A1 in the supplementary materials for descriptive statistics on these items. Table A1 shows 
that there is considerable variance in people’s belief in specific conspiracy theories between Europe 
and the US, but also within Europe. Our data confirms the notion that conspiracy belief is 
widespread as the percentage of people believing in one or more conspiracy theories varies 
between 52.3 and 84.9 in the European countries studied. This set of conspiracy theory items 
constitutes the basis of our dependent variable Conspiracy Thinking (see Methods section for more 
details). The selected conspiracy theory statements are generic in nature and are not strongly 
connected to the specific societal, economic or political systems of the examined countries; we 
therefore do not believe that our selection introduces bias in our estimation, however, one can 






Table 1: Survey Items Conspiracy Theories 
 
Item   
A Even though we live in what’s called a democracy a few people will always run things in 
this country anyway. 
B Secret plots that harm the nation are more common in this country than in other 
countries. 
C Humans have made contact with aliens and this fact has been deliberately hidden from the 
public. 
D The AIDS virus was created and spread around the world on purpose by a secret group or 
organisation.  
E Regardless of who is officially in charge of governments and other organisations, there is a 
single group of people who secretly control events and rule the world together. 
F The idea of man-made global warming is a hoax that was invented to deceive people.  
G The government is deliberately hiding the truth about how many immigrants really live in 
this country.  
H The truth about the harmful effects of vaccines is being deliberately hidden from the 
public.  
I Muslim immigration to this country is part of a bigger plan to make Muslims a majority of 
this country’s population. 
J The official account of the Nazi Holocaust is a lie and the number of Jews killed by the 
Nazis during World War II has been exaggerated on purpose.  
 
Note: Question asked: ‘ Which, if any, of the following statements would you say are true? (Please select all 
that apply)’.  
 
Methods 
Constructing the Conspiracy Thinking Dependent Variable 
For the construction of the dependent variable we conduct a common factor analysis on the basis of 
tetrachoric correlations as the conspiracy theory items are binary. From the common factor analysis 
we exclude item J as this item was not asked in all countries (see Table A1 in the supplementary 
materials). With the remaining 8 items we test the underlying dimensionality of the factor space. 
Screeplots indicate unambiguously that there is no more than a single underlying factor in all 
countries studied, with the exception of Hungary. In Hungary one item in particular is responsible for 
a possible second factor and that is item G (See Table 1). After excluding this item from the analysis, 
we find in all countries that the dimensionality of the underlying factor space is one (See Figure 1 in 
the supplementary materials). On that basis a factor analysis has been conducted, extracting one 
factor, and factor scores for each individual on that factor have been calculated. We interpret this 
factor as generic conspiracy thinking and the factor scores can be interpreted as individual scores on 
the tendency of conspiracy thinking.          
 By conducting common factor analysis we assume that part of the variance of the separate 
conspiracy theory items can be accounted for by their shared relevance for conspiracy thinking. This 
does not mean that all variance in the separate conspiracy items reflect only such a generic tendency 
of conspiracy thinking. Additionally, each of the items has also unique meaning elements, which are 
not reflected in the common factor (which reflects a generic tendency of conspiracy thinking). With 
this approach we capture from the set of conspiracy theory items the part that expresses this 
generic shared conspiracy thinking and use this as a measurement instrument.vi This shared 
conspiracy thinking is captured within the factor loadings of the common factor analysis (See Figure 
2 in the supplementary materials for the frequency distribution of conspiracy thinking per country). 
Robustness analyses showed that the dependent variable constructed is not sensitive to the items 




Method of Analysis 
Given the hierarchical nature of the data - citizens (level 1) residing within countries (level 2) - the 
obvious choice would be to estimate a multilevel regression model. However, in this study we opt 
for running fixed effects OLS regression models on pooled data instead (see Allison 2009). We do so 
as we are only dealing with 9 countries and because such a small sample size at level 2 leads to 
biased estimates of second level standard errors when using multilevel modelling (e.g. Maas and 
Hox, 2004; Bryans and Jenkins, 2016). Some might wonder why we do not conduct 9 separate 
regression analyses and subsequently compare the coefficients derived from each of these separate 
regression analyses. This strategy, however, would lead to coefficients that are not comparable 
because of the differences of distribution of the dependent and independent variables in the 
separate analyses. Moreover, it would ignore Prezworski and Teune’s (1970) dictum that the use of 
proper names as explanatory factors (in this case names of countries) is theoretically sterile and 
uninformative. Instead, we want to analyse the information about conspiracy thinking in all 
countries simultaneously. We structure the regression models in a block recursive manner to take 
into account the differences in assumed causal antecedence of individual level variables. In our fixed 
effects OLS regression models country dummies are inserted to control for the dependence of 
observations at the individual level. In all models the United States serves as the baseline. The 
statistical analyses are run on 6926 observations due to missing observations on our dependent and 
independent variables. 
 
Operationalizing the Independent Variables 
Firstly, we include in all models a set of demographic control variables measuring the respondent’s 
sex, age, marital status, employment status and level of education. These demographic controls are 
operationalized as follows:  
Male is a dummy variable measuring the sex of the respondent (1=Male; 0=Female).  
Age is grouped and measured with a set of dummy variables, namely Under24, Between 25-35, 
Between 35-45, Between 45-55 and Over55 (1=Yes; 0=No). Below 24 is the reference category.  
Unmarried is a dummy variable measuring the respondent’s marital status (1=Unmarried; 0 = 
Married). 
Unemployed is a dummy variable measuring the respondent’s employment status (1=Unemployed; 
0=Employed). 
Respondents’ level of education is measured as a set of dummy variables, respectively Primary 
Education, Secondary Education and Tertiary Education (1=Yes; 0=No). Primary is the reference 
category.  
The other individual level variables included in our models are operationalized as follows: 
Respondents’ ideological position is measured with a set of dummy variables on the basis of 
people’s self-placement in the political spectrum, respectively Left, Centre and Right (1 Yes; 0=No).  
Respondents who stated to be left wing or slightly left of centre were all labelled left. Respondents 
who stated to be right wing or slightly right of centre were all labelled right. Left is the reference 
category in all models.  
Ideological Extremity is a dummy variable measuring whether people position themselves at the 
extremes of the political spectrum (1=Ideologically Extreme; 0=Not Ideologically Extreme).  
Magical thinking is a dummy variable indicating whether respondents believe that what happens in 
life is decided by a "higher force", such as God, fate or destiny (1=Strong Magical Thinking; 0=Weak 
or No Magical Thinking).  
Economic Insecurity is a dummy variable indicating whether respondents feel pessimistic about 
their own financial situation when thinking about the next 12 months (1=Feels Pessimistic; 0=Does 
Not Feel Pessimistic).  
Representation Within Political System is measured as the extent that respondents feel 
represented in parliament. Representation Within Political System is a dummy variable indicating 
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the extent to which respondents feel that Parliament represents their interests (1=Feels Badly 
Represented; 0=Does Not Feel Badly Represented).  
Trust in Public Figures is an additive scale that runs from 6 to 24, 6 indicating absolutely no trust in 
public figures and 24 indicating a very high level of trust in public figures. The scale is constructed 
out of 6 ordinal items that measure trust in senior officials of the EU, senior officials of the US 
government, government ministers in my country, religious leaders, military leaders in my country 
and people who run large companies. Mokken scale analysis, which is a stochastic cumulative scaling 
model for ordinal variables, was used to determine the scalability of the survey items (Mokken, 
1971). The overall homogeneity of the scale is .48, which indicates medium scalability (See Table A3 
in the supplementary materials for the results of the Mokken scale analysis). 
Political System Rejection is a dummy variable indicating whether respondents reject the political 
system (1 Rejects political system; 0=Does not reject political system). Respondents received the 
value 1 when they stated that thinking about the political system in their country the statement 
“The system is broken and it would take a total change of system to put things right” best reflected 
their view. 
Respondents’ news sources are measured on the basis of a set of dummy variables indicating 
respondents’ use of this source at least 2-3 times a month to access news, respectively 
Newspaper (including online), Television, Radio, Social media, Non-associated News Website/Blog 
(not associated with a newspaper), Magazines, Podcasts, Email newsletters or RSS feeds (1=Yes; 
0=No). 
The country level variables included in our models are operationalized as follows: 
Quality of Democracy is measured using the EUI 2018 Democracy Index of which the scores are 
weighted averages to an excess of 60 questions of which most are expert assessments. The scores 
run between 0 and 10 and are rounded to two decimals.vii The score 0 represents a full autocracy 
and the score 10 represents a full democracy. 
Economic Inequality is measured using the most recent GINI index as reported by the World Bankviii, 
which is a measure of statistical dispersion representing the income or wealth distribution of a 
nation's residents. The scores run between 0 and 100, where 0 represents perfect equality and 100 
represents maximum inequality.  
Proportional Representation is measured as a dummy variable (1=Present; 0=Absent). The variable 
is based on data provided by IDEA Electoral Systems Design Database.ix  
Gross Domestic Product is measured nominally expressed in billions of dollars on the basis of the 
October 2018 International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook.x  
 
Results 
In order to construct the dependent variable Conspiracy Thinking we conducted common factor 
analysis on the responses to conspiracy theory items (See Methods section for more details). As in 
all factor analyses, the variance of the conspiracy beliefs can be understood as emanating from three 
elements, namely (1) generic conspiracy thinking (factors accounting for common variance), (2) 
item-specific beliefs that are not generic, but idiosyncratic; and (3) random noise. See Table 2 for the 
variance that generic conspiracy thinking explains of the total variance of these conspiracy theory 
items per country. The total variance explained by the first factor that reflects generic conspiracy 
thinking varies between 38.58 per cent (Portugal) and 53.38 per cent (Sweden). The unexplained 
variance reflects random noise and item-specific elements. The latter, reflects, among other factors, 
the endorsement of specific conspiracy beliefs by the dominant socio-political discourse in societies’ 
contexts, which is at least in part the result of history, but also the extent to which politicians, 
political parties, media and other sources of reference in recent times endorse specific conspiracy 
beliefs. Table 2 also displays the highest and lowest communality scores. So, for instance, the lowest 
communality in France belongs to item B and it reflects the extent to which individual variation in 




Table 2: Explained Variance and Lowest/Highest Communality Scores Conspiracy Theory Items 







France 42.178 .302 B .418 D 
Sweden 53.384 .434 C .630 D 
Germany 44.091 .193 B .460 E 
Great 
Britain 
50.126 .339 A .521 F 
Italy 44.739 .266 A/B .578 D 
Portugal 38.584 .247 B .448 F 
Poland 42.725 .189 A .525 D 
Hungary 40.515 .211 A .561 D 
United 
States 
45.892 .310 C .636 I 
Note: Method: Common Factor Analysis extracting one factor using tetrachoric correlations. Extraction 
method: Unweighted Least Squares. Second column presents the variance of the total variance of the separate 
items explained by the first factor. Third and fourth column display the lowest communality score and the item 
it belongs to. The fifth and sixth column display the highest communality score and the item it belongs to. 
Communality scores should be interpreted as the extent to which individual variation in responses to that item 
can be understood as emanating from generic conspiracy thinking.  
 
In this study we explain people’s tendency to conspiracy thinking across nine countries on the basis 
of individual and context characteristics. First of all, contrary to our expectations the variance that 
can be accounted for by proper names of countries is low, namely 2 per cent (See Table A6 in the 
supplementary materials). This justifies our choice to focus in our presentation of results on 
individual-level predictors of conspiracy thinking. Table 2 displays the effect of individual 
characteristics on conspiracy thinking. Model 1 in Table 2 starts out with the set of 
sociodemographic variables and shows that male, unemployed and older people have an increased 
tendency to conspiracy thinking. We find no effect for Secondary education. We do find an effect for 
Tertiary education, but this effect disappears when controlling for sample composition effects, see 
Model 3. Therefore, and contrary to much of the literature, we reject our Education Hypothesis. This 
might lead us to reflect upon what type of skills higher education offers in different national 
contexts, and how strongly analytical skills, agency and empowerment are linked to higher 
education, which seem to be more speculative hypotheses than demonstrable theses. It might also 
make us reflect further on the link  education entertains with race, wealth, socialisation and 
selection effects (Uscinski and Parent, 2014). The sociodemographic variables only explain 1 per cent 















Table 3 Effects of Individual Characteristics on General Conspiracy Thinking  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
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Sweden   -.231** 
(.047) 
-.067 
France   -.079 
(.048) 
-.023 
Germany   -.231** 
(.038) 
-.096 




Poland   -.420** 
(.043) 
-.131 
Great Britain   -.305** 
(.072) 
-.048 
Italy   -.176** 
(.044) 
-.056 










Adjusted R2 .010 .105 .126  
AIC 18013.331  17321.171  17163.948   
Note: N=6926 Method is Fixed Effects OLS Regression Models. Table displays for model 1 to 3 unstandardized 
regression coefficients. The standard errors are in parentheses. ° significant at 0.10. *significant at 0.05. 
**significant at 0.01. For age under 24 is the reference category. For education primary is the reference 
category. For ideological position leftwing is the reference category. For the country dummies the United States 
is the reference category. Model 4 displays the x-standardized regression coefficients of Model 3, which means 
the x-variables expressed in standard deviations and the y-variable in its original units. X-standardized 
regression coefficients show the relative importance of the independent variables.  
 
 Model 2 contains in addition to the sociodemographic variables the hypothesized individual-
level predictors of generic conspiracy thinking. Adding these individual–level predictors significantly 
improves the fit of the model, which explains 10.5 per cent of the variance of generic conspiracy 
thinking. The results show that people’s ideological position is relevant for people’s tendency to 
conspiracy thinking. The more people position themselves ideologically towards the right of the 
political spectrum, the stronger their inclination to conspiracy thinking. The variable Ideological 
Extremity is only significant at 0.10 level. We find that people’s propensity to conspiracy thinking is 
indeed conditional on the extremity of their ideological position, but more so for people who 
position themselves on the right side of the political spectrum. We find some evidence for our 
Ideological Extremity Hypothesis. Our finding is in line with recent work that points to ideological 
asymmetry in conspiracy thinking, i.e. right wing extremists are more likely to engage in conspiracy 
thinking than left wing extremists, because right wing extremists have personality predispositions, 
such as low tolerance for uncertainty and a desire for simple solutions, that encourage conspiracy 
thinking  (Linden et al. 2020). In addition to finding people’s propensity to conspiracy thinking to be 
linked to their ideological position, we find conspiracy thinking to be higher for people who score 
high on magical thinking. The results support our Magical Thinking Hypothesis.  
 People tend to have a higher propensity to conspiracy thinking when they have less trust in 
public officials, feel pessimistic about their own financial situation, feel not represented by 
parliament and reject the political system. We thus find support for our Political Distrust, Economic 
Insecurity, Representation Within the Political System and Political System Rejection Hypotheses.  
Finally, Model 2 also examines the link between people’s media use and their propensity to 
conspiracy thinking. We find reading newspapers to be negatively associated with conspiracy 
thinking and using social media, websites and blogs that are not associated with newspapers to be 
positively associated with conspiracy thinking. We did not find any effect for the use of television, 
radio, magazines, podcasts and email letters or RSS feeds as news source on people’s propensity for 
conspiracy thinking. We did not incorporate these variables in our final model displayed here. We 
have checked that by omitting these variables the changes in regression coefficients of individual-
level variables are not due to the changes in number of observations on which the analyses are run. 
See for these robustness tests Table A7 in the supplementary materials. 
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 We know that people respond differently in specific contexts. When we enter the country 
dummies to control for the differences between countries (Model 3), we see that the coefficients of 
the country dummies for Sweden, Germany, Poland, Italy, Great Britain and Hungary are negative 
and significant. This indicates that people residing in these six countries have on average a slightly 
lower level of conspiracy thinking than the United States, which is the baseline for the model. No 
significant differences were found for Portugal and France, these countries have on average a similar 
level of conspiracy thinking to the United States. Including the country dummies improves the fit of 
our model and helps us explain 12.6 per cent of the variance, but leaves us with 87.4 per cent 
unexplained. This suggest that the independent variables evidently carry little explanatory power 
and thus that the role of demographic and socio-political attitudes identified in our model as well as 
literature as drivers of generic conspiracy thinking is limited. 
 To know the relative importance of the independent variables for explaining conspiracy 
thinking, we standardized the independent variables and not the dependent variable. The x-
standardized regression coefficients are calculated on the basis of Model 3, which are displayed in 
Model 4. For example, the results show that one standard deviation increase in feeling rejected by 
the system on average results in an .110 increase in conspiracy thinking. The most important 
variables for explaining generalized conspiracy thinking in our model are Rightwing, Trust in Public 
Figures, Magical Thinking and System Rejection. We are confident that the findings presented are 
robust and not driven by a particular country (see for the results of our jackknife sample sensitivity 
analysis Figures A8 in the supplementary materials). 
 A further exploration of the main effects and the interactions between context and 
individual variables (i.e. moderation effects) did not deliver substantial effects, i.e. they did not meet 
the criterion of at least explaining 1.5 per cent of the 87.4 per cent unexplained variance: the effects 
were so small in size that they are negligible. The following context variables (Quality of Democracy, 
Economic Inequality, Proportional Representation, Gross Domestic Product) and the following 
individual factors (Economic Insecurity, Feeling Represented in Parliament, Political System 
Rejection) were examined. For reasons of brevity these analyses are not reported here, but they can 
be found in Table A9 in the supplementary materials. 
 
Conclusion 
This study examined what drives people’s tendency towards conspiracy thinking in Europe and the 
United States. We did so by analysing 2018 survey data of respondents living in Sweden, Germany, 
Poland, Italy and Hungary, Portugal, France, Great Britain and the United States using representative 
samples of the population. To our knowledge this is the largest integrated comparative study to 
date. This study shows that it is possible to study conspiracy thinking comparatively using a set of 
specific conspiracy theories. We found that the dominant structure of conspiracy beliefs consists of a 
single common factor, which we labelled conspiracy thinking. This finding has at least two 
implications. First, that it would be incorrect to consider individual and specific conspiracy theories 
as only relating to their specific content (e.g., as reflecting simply belief in global warming or belief in 
the existence of aliens). Second, these findings also imply that individuals’ subscription to individual 
and specific conspiracy beliefs cannot be reduced to only this generic tendency. This therefore 
leaves room for at least two complementary strands of further research: (a) determinants of and 
consequences of generic conspiracy thinking; and (b) determinants of and consequences of specific 
individual conspiracy beliefs, after having controlled for their generic drivers.  
At the individual level we found that people who are male, old, unemployed, positioned at 
the ideologically extremes, who do not feel represented by parliament, feel economically insecure, 
and use for their news source blogs and non-mainstream social media instead of newspapers have 
on average a stronger tendency towards conspiracy thinking. We did not find an effect for 
education, marital status and other media sources. However, the most important predictors for 
conspiracy thinking are being rightwing, feeling distrust towards public officials, engaging in magical 
thinking and rejecting the political system. This comparative study thereby demonstrates the 
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broader applicability of these factors already identified in some earlier (mostly single country) 
studies. When one relies on single country studies to replicate earlier work, one cannot rule out that 
(minor) methodological differences affect the generalizability of the claims made. Such problems do 
not afflict a comparative study as presented here. Our model - including all these individual level 
predictors and controlling for country heterogeneity - only explains 12.6 per cent, indicating that 
many other important predictors of conspiracy thinking were not incorporated. This suggests that 
the focus on socio-structural variables as the main explanatory factors is perhaps misplaced and that 
psychological and personality constructs need to be considered further.  
 The results in this study show surprisingly that only 2 per cent of the variance lies at the 
country-level, which tells us that to explain generic conspiracy thinking we must look at people’s 
characteristics more so than the characteristics of the country in which they reside. In addition, we 
find surprisingly that the country-level and cross-level predictors (i.e. moderation effects) suggested 
in the literature had no substantial effect. This unexpected finding can be explained in several ways. 
First, the finding can be interpreted to reflect that conspiracy thinking is a purely psychological 
phenomenon, not or little affected by context (i.e., by social, political and economic characteristics 
of a country). Second, it is also possible that country characteristics do affect people’s propensity to 
engage in conspiracy thinking but that the measurement instrument used to gauge conspiracy 
thinking is too abstract to reveal this. This is a likely possibility as all countries included in our sample  
are very similar in terms of economic wealth, value system and a shared interpretation of 
contemporary history. A future comparative study should therefore try to expand its scope beyond 
western, wealthy and democratic countries. Third, country characteristics may moderate people’s 
tendency to conspiracy thinking, but other characteristics than the ones included in our analyses. 
Future research should try to model other elements of the political and societal context, such as for 
instance political culture and the quality of the information environment. A further study should 
develop new and more specific theories on how country differences matter. Therefore, although this 
study surprisingly finds limited variance at the country level and no substantial effect of the 
modelled characteristics, this cannot be regarded as definitive support for the notion that context is 
irrelevant as a moderating factor.  
 
 We did find however across the board country effects, namely that people residing in 
Sweden, Germany, Great Britain, Poland, Italy and Hungary score overall slightly lower on conspiracy 
thinking that people in the United States. The overall level of conspiracy thinking in France and 
Portugal was equal to that of the United States. These differences can potentially be explained in 
two ways. First of all, this can be the result of differences in language. When the conspiracy theory 
items were translated the items may have received in some languages a somewhat stronger (or, 
conversely, weaker) meaning. Second, these across the board effects might derive from country-
specific cultural or historical differences that are not captured by the statistical models estimated. 
However, to test whether these findings are indeed the result of cultural and historical differences it 
would be helpful to have more than one moment of measurement per country.  
 
By laying the groundwork towards a general theory of conspiracy thinking, this study had offered a 
first, tentative, step towards these endeavours.  
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i We acknowledge the possibility that the relationship between levels of institutional trust and conspiracy 
thinking is non-recursive. However, the data does not allow to test rivalling causal interpretations.  
ii See also endnote 1.  
iii A main effect constitutes here a direct effect of country characteristics on the overall level of conspiracy 
thinking. 
iv A moderation effect constitutes here the modification of direction or strength of the relationship between an 
individual-level predictor and the dependent variable conspiracy thinking, as effectuated by a country 
characteristic. 
v A composition effect constitutes that countries matter because of the difference in constellation of the 
countries’ population. 
vi We run common factor analysis instead of Mokken scale analysis (Mokken, 1971). Mokken scale analysis 
assumes that the items can be ordered by degree of ‘difficulty’, which would require the same ordering of 
items in all countries. We consider this an unrealistic assumption as the variance of the conspiracy items not 
only reflects generic conspiracy thinking, but also the popularity of items, which we expect to differ between 
countries.  
vii https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=Democracy2018, visited on 2 December 2019. 
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